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1. Introduction
In 1890, John W. Burgess stated that a “complete constitution” cannot 
get enough without the amending clause and the power that it describes and 
regulates, that is the amending power (Burgess, (1890), p. 137). One hundred 
years later, Akhil R. Amar’s description of the unsurpassed importance of the 
rules that govern its amendment and its entrenchment against it (AmAr (1994), 
p. 461) revives Burgess’ reasoning. Recently, Yaniv Roznai opens his remarkable 
book in the same spirit, explaining the meaning and importance of constitutional 
amendments arguing that “formal constitutional amendments not only remain an 
essential means of constitutional change but also […] raise imperative questions 
for constitutional theory” (roznAi (2017a), p. 2).
There is a tight legal link between constitutionalism and constitutional amend-
ment power. The amendment power is an ”extraordinary [mutable] authority”1 in 
the hands of the people and the amendment process is a mechanism to share 
(TriBe and LAndry (1993), p. 631) and delegate (Roznai (2017b), p. 5) part of their 
authority to future generations. The theory of constitutional amendments, espe-
cially that focusing on formal amendment rules, has emerged as one of the most 
central issues for modern constitutional theory. Constitutional change occurs in 
two ways, constitutionally or unconstitutionally, depending on the conceivability 
of constitutional amendments to modify and enrich the existing constitutional 
content and/or the established supreme principles. If a constitutional consti-
tutional amendment should be able to stand alone without compromising the 
spirit of the constitution, an unconstitutional constitutional amendment compro-
mises those principles and values on which a democratic constitutional order is 
founded.
In recent years, scholars have produced literature on constitutional amend-
ments, in particular on the analysis of the unamendability phenomenon and its 
relationship with democracy, abusive and populist constitutionalism. The study 
of constitutional design is of interest, in large part, because a constitution can be 
amended and such processes make room for the fundamental questions about 
legitimacy of the constitutional order, the holder and the locus of sovereignty, 
especially in those legal orders where a popular legitimated process of altering 
the constitution is entrenched. Indeed, in some legal orders “We, the People” are 
called to initiate and/or approve any constitutional change, but, as demonstrat-
ed, democratic constitutions undermine popular participation in such processes.
1 There are many interpretations about the nature and the function of this ”extraordinary authority” (Cf. 
schmiTT (2008), p. 150). Scholars consider it a constituent power and/or a constituted power, having a sui 
generis character that moves within a spectrum. See roznAi (2017), pp. 117 ss.
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The need for further discussion on citizen-led constitutional change exists 
because constitutional change is a complex ‘labyrinth’ intertwining amendment 
procedures, political actors, and centres of authority, and such processes must 
be studied in any part, considering them from an integrated perspective. Ex-
ploring and modelling constitutional change demands a correlation between 
actors and mechanisms within a given legal order, and this process inevitably 
touches all areas of constitutional law and the allocation of powers. As long as 
amendment procedures are designated as adaptive approaches to altering cir-
cumstances, formal changes provide means for resolving conflicts between con-
stitutional actors, especially with regard to the allocation of amendment power. 
Scholarship has well-described the principle of vertical separation of powers, the 
“people” sovereignty, and the enforcement of the theory by the courts. However, 
the people’s role in constitutional changes are less scrutinized. The narrowness 
of the literature regarding people’s capacity to strengthen constitutional rigidity 
is not because their amendment power is irrelevant or consists in a secondary 
matter within democratic constitutional design, nor because of its misperceived 
secondary nature within the institutional structure of a political system. From the 
constitutional theory’s outlook, what “the People” is, is an never-ending saga. As 
constitutional authority, the concept has been considered and reconsidered; it 
is a component that emerges and re-emerges in certain historical moments and 
specific political, social and cultural circumstances in which institutions, politi-
cians, scholarship or jurisprudence dedicate more or less space and interest to 
it. In recent times, modern constitutionalism is threated or challenged by chang-
ing movements and, facing the populist waves, “‘the People’ have become con-
stitutional theory’s hottest fashion.” (gewirTzmAn (2005), p. 898)
In this view, the paper brings the reader alongside the “We, the People” 
claim, stressing, though in restrictive manner, who “the People” are, how they 
act and react, and when their actions unveil a(n) (un)constitutional change, in 
order to draw citizen-led constitutional changes grounded on three keywords 
– populism, (un)constitutional amendments and constitutionalism. The paper is 
an invitation to the development of “the people” approaches in a constitutional 
framework that struck populism as democracy’s sentinel.
2. Excursus alongside of “We, the People” entitlement
The common trait of modern constitutionalism lies in democracy rising from 
the “We, the People” will. Nowadays, it is a formalized expression in more than 
fifty world constitutions. This part highlights some paradigms in the definition of 
“the people”, emphasizes the conditions and the key moments of its authority. 
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This part tries to give an answer to three main issues concerning the identity 
of this entity, the timeline and the modality in which it governs constitutional 
changes. 
2.1. Who are “we, the People”?
From the constitutional theory’s outlook, “the People” is a never-ending 
saga: from the wording of ancient Greeks as demos, populus, plithos, óchlos, 
syllogikótita, ethnos to the arguments of modern constitutionalists in favor of 
an actor holder, bearer or protagonist of a constitutional order, the vexed is-
sue of “we, the People” identification still remains a question with no complete 
answer. Defining this notion is a carousel and it looks a lot like «Woody Allen’s 
Zelig, inhabiting whatever incarnation is needed to conform with the theoretical 
backdrop» (gewirTzmAn (2005), p. 898). At different times, “the People” embody 
the nation or a unity, the society or a collectivity, dwell in the shoes of different 
entities, the electorate, interest groups, identity-based social movements, the 
Parliament or Congress, the President or Head of State, government and its 
institutions, political parties, or impact-litigation plaintiffs. Going beyond any oth-
er imagination, “the People” figure an arbiter, a warden or a manager (okLopcic 
(2017), pp. 48-9) of their own expectations in every sector of their life.
Nowadays, the revival of attention to this notion and its variegated inter-
pretation allow us to identify a three-dimensional pattern considering three 
connotations: substantiveness, representativeness and inclusiveness. The first 
dimension, of the substance, mirrors the classic paradigm of people as unity 
or collectivity, drawing on popular sovereignty doctrine. The second aspect, of 
representativeness, runs into an emergent paradigm based on the binomial is-
sue of crowd and few, and developed around the “pure” people vs. elite debate. 
The third element, of inclusiveness, brings in an immanent paradigm facing the 
people as citizens or residents within a territory and related to the constitutional 
identity matter. 
The classic paradigm delivers two interpretations of “the people”– “We, the 
People” as preternatural organic unity or “us, the People” as a group of individu-
als – harks back to the popular sovereignty theory. Framing popular sovereignty 
as constituent power is to affirm the basic democratic value of self-government, 
that is, collective acts of self-legislation and public events of self-alteration. In this 
context, the people regard themselves as the agents able to institute and adjust 
a constitution, so, they are responsible for a foundational constitution’s content 
and in the years to come. In our time, democracy is seen as an “evolutionary 
democracy” in which the people not only transfer (or delegate) the general will to 
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the representatives, but adjust their will over time through different institutions. 
The participatory and representative aspects of democracy become comple-
mentary, endowing the people with greater protagonism within the process of 
forming the general will both as an organic unity through “the people-as-one” 
and through social groups. The normative content of the constituent sovereign 
is one of participation and the binding higher law is valid only if the act created 
complies with the principle of participation and reflects the “superhuman general 
will” of the “supernatural body” (ArendT (1963), p. 60; Friedrich (1950), p. 128), 
intrinsically and substantively limited by norms of international law, super-consti-
tutional principles, and values of modern constitutionalism (BAchoF (1951), pp. 
29-32).
The “who” of democracy has long been defended and contested and rarely 
democracy has been understood as rule by all the people (Brown (2015), p. 19). 
According to Ackerman (AckermAn (1991), p. 186) and Kramer (krAmer (2004), 
p. 253), “We, the People” are the collection of human persons, are ultimately a 
group of individuals, “an actual authority” who participates in various ways in 
the founding or the interpreting of a constitution, but only performing through 
government because their corporate capacity cannot exist outside institutional 
forms; thus, individual persons have to be represented. 
Hence, the second dimension categorizing an emergent paradigm based 
on the issue of the representativeness of the mob (the “ordinary, real or pure” 
people) vis-à-vis the few (the elite) developed around the contemporary debate 
on populism and constitutionalism, on their differences and oxymoronic interpre-
tation (hALmAi, 2017). On the one hand, the people from whom all governmental 
authority is supposed to derive does not comprise a subject with willpower and 
awareness. It only appears in the plural, and as a people, it is capable of neither 
decision nor action as a unity (hABermAs (1988), p. 469). On the other hand, the 
people (in the singular) represents a political homogeneous and antagonistic 
unity (mudde (2004), p. 543; cAnovAn (1999), pp. 1-16), an endless body, capable 
of action because it only is able to express the common will and take decisions 
suitable to the common people’s interests (cAnovAn (2002), p. 34). The concept 
of authority cannot imply the concept of power. A whole, or better, popular mob 
exercises de facto power only in the context of a riot, but a multitude cannot 
exercise authority. The governors, political parties, leaders – only few – have the 
authority to represent the mob as a whole. 
To better describe this perspective, it is worth bearing in mind the 
 Schumpeter’s definition according to which “the people” act as the electorate, 
realizing their “common good” by electing representatives/leaders who they be-
lieve will better represent their needs (schumpeTer (2008), p. 269). This under-
standing underpins the dichotomy between liberal democracy and populism, 
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between the mob and the few. Liberal or populist representatives, both want to 
give voice to the people and defend their interests. Still, the former, once elect-
ed, represent the nation in accordance with the imperative mandate principle, 
and in the latter, representativeness is only a tool to embody the will of that unity 
( corriAs (2016), p. 19). Therein lies the paradox of sovereignty and representa-
tion that populists fail to perceive: the nation is the source of a legal order, a 
singular entity that has to be represented. They defend only a specific part of 
representation overlooking the constitutive role of it. 
The relationship and mediation between the mob and the few, particularly in 
the political will-formation, is reflected on the constitutional and governmental ar-
rangements (mAir (2002), pp. 88-89). Populists prioritize an efficient government 
over representation and emphasize the role of individual leader in politics and its 
personalization vis-à-vis traditional party structures and in electoral competition 
(BLondeL and ThieBAuLT (2010)), as well as the individual responsibility of office-
holders and decision-makers. Parliament is only an instrument of government 
rather than as an institution of unbiased representation. Thus, the main trick is 
who governs and who represents “the people”, as it too frequently induces a 
leader of “the few” category.
A democratic system must not be reduced to mere participation in elections; 
it should disclose, design and promote the constitutional culture of popular in-
volvement (ALBerT (2008), p. 3). And the populists have made this a slogan. But 
also in this perspective populists failed because they do not consider what Albert 
has termed the counterconstitutionalism, which undermines the premise of pop-
ular participation (ALBerT (2008), pp. 27-8, 37-44), assembling a heterogeneity 
of social identities and partial demands under some name, or empty signifier, 
which confers upon this plurality a fictional, precarious unity, thereby establishing 
a hegemonic order (LAcLAu (2005), p. 19). The constituted unity of «single ethnic 
or racial […], either implicitly or explicitly, in a deeply exclusionary manner» (huq 
(2018), p. 1126) rejects itself other categories of a given polity; it could create, 
especially in illiberal democracies, what Tushnet hypothetically presumed, “the 
second-class” citizenry (TushneT (2017), p. 1372) protected against arbitrary gov-
ernment action but with restricted rights. In this perspective, a third dimension, 
of the inclusiveness, provides for an immanent paradigm built on the dichotomy 
among citizens and non-citizens and related to the constitutional identity issue. 
Mainly, as a normative concept, constitutional identity is a tangled issue 
(mArTí (2013), pp.18-9) with no universal and uniform definition or scope of ap-
plication (rosenFeLd (2012), p. 756; JAcoBsohn (2006), pp. 361-397; TushneT 
(2010), pp. 671-76). On the one hand, the identity of the constituent subject 
turns into the major standard of the assessments of the validity of democratic 
constitutions and institutional arrangements. If the locus of ultimate source of 
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legitimacy is bottom-up, originating in “the people” (preuss (2007), p. 211) and 
the constitution is an expression of constituent power of the people (TushneT 
(2014), p. 24) to make and remake the institutional arrangements through which 
they are governed (ForsyTh (1981), p. 191; winTgens (2001), p. 274), the “con-
stitutive essence” achieves broader interpretation in the context of the European 
Union (FArAgunA (2017), pp. 1617-40) where, unlike the BVerfG2 or the Italian 
Constitutional Court,3 the Hungarian Constitutional Court empowered itself to 
review unconstitutional amendments (Drinóczi (2017), pp. 139-51) and recog-
nized a new doctrine of constitutional identity rooted in the historical Constitu-
tion, informally amended in the Fundamental Law of 2012. But the Hungarian 
constitutional identity demonstrates an individualistic feature and detachment 
from the common European task (körTvéLyesi and mAJTényi (2017), pp. 1721-44) 
and shapes a constitutionalism termed as abusive, authoritarian, and illiberal 
(TushneT (2016), pp. 1 ss.; LAndAu (2013), p. 191). Interestingly, the ruling follows 
the asylum-seekers “quota decision” of the EU Council (Decision 2015/1601),4 
contested by the Government on the grounds of the alteration of the ethnic and 
religious composition of Hungary. In addition, the newly-adopted amendment to 
the Fundamental Law of Hungary enforcing the protection of Christian culture 
constitutionally legitimizes an “ethnic nation,” a Christian community to which 
seems to belong only ethnic Hungarians and exclude those who are not Chris-
tians (hALmAi (Jun 29, 2018)). Thus, is not this the context that can give rise to 
some sort of “second-class” citizenship as imagined by Tushnet?
On the other hand, constitutional identity can also be conceived quite natu-
rally as the national identity5 and the non-necessarily-national identity of a political 
community. As long as the constitution is not a mere legal norm, but the funda-
mental norm created for unifying a heterogeneous collectivity, it might be under-
stood as a tool underpinning a demos (ivison (1999), p. 84). The constitution itself 
2 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Dec. 15, 2015, 140 BVerfGE 
317, para. 41. On the Lisbon decision and its effects on Member States, see cLAes and reesTmAn, (2015). 
For a comparison between Italian and German interpretation of constitutional identity and the counter- 
-limits, see drinóczi (2018). 
3 Constitutional Court decision, 31 May 2018, no. 115 (ECLI:IT:COST:2018:115), G.U. 06/06/2018, no. 
23. For developments in the Taricco case, see FABBrini and poLLicino (2017); FArAgunA (2017); krAJewski 
(2017).
4 Calling on the Hungarian people to cast their ballot, a referendum concerning the European Union’s 
power to impose the mandatory relocation of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the consent of 
the National Assembly took place but did not attain the required structural quorum. As a consequence of 
this unsuccessful referendum, the amendment was intended to supplement the Fundamental Law with a 
provision that incorporate the alleged “constitutional identity” of Hungarian citizens stating that, in order 
to secure and defend the “nation-building” character, Hungary does not desire to surrender its “cultural 
homogeneity” and “alien peoples cannot be re-settled in Hungary.”
5 It is not the case (to which I will not refer to) of pluri-national constitutional states such as Switzerland, 
Canada, Belgium or Spain, but also the United States.
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«opens up to the idea of integration and calls for, at least expects some kind of 
inner acceptance, a basic identification by those who “live under” it» (voLkmAnn 
(2017), p. 1649). 
Moreover, its interpretation by judicial and executive actors as well as certain 
norms enacted by the legislature6 may influence collective self-identity of a demos 
in which both citizens and non-citizens find a foundation. And in this perspective, 
the immanent problem of immigration leads to the so-called  Leitkultur (hABermAs 
(2017)), the relationship between national culture and constitution. Undoubtedly, 
the cultural character of a nation takes time to change and no amendment pro-
cedure is available for such change (JAkAB (2018), p. 5), but immigration law 
and policies contribute to the self-definition of a nation or community – they are 
relevant for the construction of a given constitutional self-image and the delim-
itation of who “we, the people” are.7 But, the extent to which non-citizens (or, 
foreign residents) are mirrored in the self-image of a nation depends on a twofold 
willingness of inclusiveness: of the citizens to include non-citizens, and of the 
non-citizens to be included in that nation. Based on the same bidirectional axis 
of inclusiveness, non-citizens could be part of the mob and involved in constitu-
tional changes, as well as encompassed in the unity and enjoying voting rights 
in national legislative elections (Finck (2015), p. 78). However, it is difficult in this 
context to legitimate the political community as a whole and define democracy 
with Schmitt’s words as a “substantial identity” of all citizens, well suited to the 
populist vision of political community as a homogenous political body with a 
common, single will of the people.
“The people” as sovereign actor of intra-constitutional and extra-constitu-
tional identity is meant to evolve (rosenFeLd (2010)). Its consistence and dimen-
sion change over time (dixon and hoLden (2012), p. 195) and any change in its 
structure brings about an alteration in the people’s collective constitutional iden-
tity. Moreover, political aspiration and the desire to transcend the nation’s past 
via formal procedures of constitutional amendments has the potential to alter 
the identity of the people itself.8 Amending constitutional identity in the attempt 
to render it more inclusive isn’t always successful and depends on the popular 
6 Legislatures enjoy an effective power to overrule rights and court decisions interpreting rights, either 
by legislative override or constitutional amendment, in particular in those countries where there is a strong 
culture of constitutional amendment and feasible rules to override court interpretations. Cf. dixon and mc-
mAnus (2018); dixon and LAndAu (2015).
7 See for example, the burka-ban in France, constitutional amendments or national laws on abortion in 
Ireland, Germany, Latin America, on same-sex marriage in Romania or on asylum-seekers in Hungary. In 
this sense, see nAgy (2017) on amendment to the Hungarian Asylum Law. See also hALmAi (2018).
8 For such examples in India, Ireland, Israel, and the United States, see JAcoBsohn (2010).
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attitude towards such constitutional changes.9 Tensions within a constitutional 
order and disharmony between a constitutional document and the society it 
seeks to regulate modify the dynamics of constitutional identity with the risk of 
inducing constitutionalism’s most vexing question: an unconstitutional constitu-
tion (LAndAu, dixon and roznAi (forthcoming 2018).
2.2. When do “We, the People” act?
“The people” is a protean concept and as a consequence they act differently 
depending upon which “moment of democracy” they are in (kALyvAs (2000), pp. 
1525-65). Thus, the element of time is a variable that must be considered in 
order to establish whether the people are constituting, governing, or amending 
a constitution. 
Through a Schmittian lenses, there are three moments of the manifestation 
of the people’s power in relation to the constitution: first, the constituent power 
is exercised prior to or in the moment of constitutional creation; second, once a 
constitution is created, the people’s power persists during its “life” through the 
elected representatives who act on behalf of them; third, it exists alongside the 
constitution as a continuous presence which can be reactivated in any moment 
through popular mobilization, which as a revolutionary power, remains inalien-
able and unlimited. That the people can act directly or through representative 
institutions does not undermine the juridical utility of the concept. In fact, theoret-
ically and juridically, the people are at their strongest when it is possible for them 
to act in each of these moments. Nonetheless, I will try to answer the question 
regarding part considering popular constitutional time in terms of three cycles: 
creation, transition, and replacement. 
The creation corresponds to that genuine moment of “pure foundation” in 
which the constituent power is “an absolute beginning” understood as principle 
(schmiTT (1993), pp.23-4). The transition itself states a change or an alteration 
by means of amendments allowing the constituent power to continue alongside 
the constitution it created and preserving its identity over time, until a “consti-
tutional revolution” takes place and favours the replacement, a sort of a “new 
foundation”, a “reconstitution”. Such configuration of “constitutional moments” 
conceals some complexities. 
One of the core difficulties concerns the relationship people – constitution. 
The way of identifying this link is assumed by a tricky question: do the people 
create a constitution or does a constitution create “the people”? On the one 
9 On how forms of constitutional “amendment gap” undermine constitutional identity in the United 
States and Australia see dixon (2012),.
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hand, constituent power is called into being by the very process of creation, that 
is, a constitution-making power that presupposes the existence of a demos. On 
the other hand, constitution-making involves nation building, the creation of a 
single nation unifying previously diverse entities and the constitution creating its 
people (TushneT (1983). 
Another perplexity regards the foundation – revolution tie. Constitutional 
foundation is the very establishment of a new constitution, and a legal order 
and constitutional revolution are synonyms of constitutional change, peacefully 
or conflictually occurred. If the former does not give rise to misconstructions as 
“pure, absolute beginning” in the strict sense, difficulties and shortfalls depend 
on the meaning given to the constitutional moment as a “new, different begin-
ning” that compromises the meaning of the later. There is only one moment 
in the Schmittian sense when constituent power is prior in authority and time 
and in which the addressees of the law become its authors; all subsequent 
constitutional changes are consequences of political processes that precede a 
constitution’s enactment, “imposed” from above and not a result of a “consti-
tutional revolution” by the people (ArendT (2018), p. 299). Yet, as Antonio Negri 
has claimed, the revolutionary power of “the multitude” can disrupt constituted 
boundaries (negri (1999), p. 333).10 It appears that creation and replacement 
cycles could overlap because “constitution-making tends to occur in waves,” 
(eLsTer (1995), p. 368) either creating ex novo a political order or reversing the 
existing one. 
Hence another complexity is configured and regarding the dichotomy be-
tween revision and revolution. First of all, we have to start from the premise 
that constitutional change could regard a transformation in the constitution and 
of the constitution but not every “change in the constitution” entails a “change 
of constitution” (mArTí (2013), pp. 17 ss). In this sense, there are two types of 
constitutional change: amendments and replacements. A conceptual distinction 
between ‘amendment’ and ‘revision’, pursuant to which different procedures 
are applied to amend or revise the constitutional text, allows assessing the clas-
sical distinction between total and partial revision (Albert (forthcoming 2019)).11 
Different degrees of rigidity allow to differentiate between formal amendment, as 
“normal revision”, which aims to modify or integrate parts or single provisions of 
the constitutions, and constitutional revision as “qualified revision” implement-
ed in order to totally change the constitutional text in an extraordinary man-
ner that upsets the fundamental assumptions of the constitution (viviAni schLein 
(1987), p. 1673; BonFigLio (2015), p. 109). The former relates to a “change in the 
10 See also vATTer (2007).
11 See also ALBerT (2018).
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constitution” and the latter relates to a total revision, a “change of the constitution,” 
a replacement of a whole constitutional text through a constitutional pre-or-
dained procedure that can only take place in the presence of a revolution (mor-
TATi (1952), pp. 29-65; BAriLe (1950), p. 472); Locke (1980), pp. 226-7). Moreover, 
when the “constitutive essence” of the constitution is substantially amended, 
any change to it produces a “change of constitution” and requires not only an 
amendment of that part, but a whole revolution.
The last perplexity concerns the correlation between transition and replace-
ment. They are distinct from the pure creation, and emerge and re-emerge over 
time. According to Schmitt, the constituent power continues alongside a posi-
tive constitution (keLLy (2004), p. 126). On the contrary, scholars of liberal con-
stitutionalism consider that the constituent power disappears and runs out in 
the new constitutional regime and «it comes into play only when the existing 
regime has been dissolved» (rAwLs (1993), p. 231). In the wake of the tradi-
tional distinction between original and derived constituent power, Yaniv Roznai 
has distinguished between primary and secondary constituent powers (roznAi 
(2017), pp. 120-3), which correspond to framing power and amending power 
(kLein and sAJó (2012), p. 414), that is, the power to establish a constitution and 
the power to amend it. The people have the right to establish a new legal order 
but have the authority to revise what they constitute.12 Both constitution-making 
and constitution-amendment powers are constitutive because there is a con-
stituent feature in both processes as long as they constitute (or institute) new 
constitutional rules. Developing a theory, Roznai has determined how unamend-
ability blocks certain constitutional modifications through the exercise of amend-
ment procedures, and how the primary constituent power always has the ability 
to re-emerge and disregard it. According to this theory, certain constitutional 
amendments can be unconstitutional because they attempt to create a new 
constitution. 
2.3. How do “We, the People” change a constitutional order?
In a democracy, there is a fundamental political decision by those who hold 
the constitution-making power, more specifically, this is a decision by the peo-
ple over the constitution (schmiTT (2008) p. 140), but constitutions do not ad-
equately express the will of the people (versTeeg (2014), p. 1133). History has 
12 Following Cicero’s approach (De Legibus 3, 12, 38), Hannah Arendt (ArendT (2006), p. 91) made the 
distinction between constitution-making power possessed by the people and thus, “the power resides in 
the people”, and constitution-amendment power as an authority vested in a constitutional organ, which 
“rests with the Senate”. 
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demonstrated that the constitutions are a result of the decision made by the 
people. The constitution-making body cannot actually be the people as a whole; 
it is a constituent assembly, a representative of the people that decides in the 
aggregate for the people. If the foundation of the constitution and State were to 
be treated as an act of representation, the constituent power would be absorbed 
into the constituted power. This does not mean that the constituted power – the 
creature – abolishes, overcomes and nullifies the constituent power – the crea-
tor. Furthermore, as recent democratic constitutional changes show, the crea-
tor becomes the interpreter of its creation, able to pour such authority beyond 
the constitution moment; those who draft the constitutional text often appoint 
those who lead the court that is charged with interpreting the new constitution-
al text (dixon (2015), p. 3), and all this “in the name of the people”. This way, 
drafter-interpreters bias the “negative legislator”, which should be not a maker 
but an “unmaker” of amendments or laws given their unconstitutionality. This 
weak-form review allows to interpret laws and amendments so as to hold their 
consistency with the constitution or to appeal to the legislator by a declaration 
of incompatibility, without considering them “negative legislators” even though 
their review may have some indirect impact. (TushneT (2011), p. 323; hy chen And 
poiAres mAduro (2013), pp. 102-3). A tricky issue may arise when constitutional 
courts are “positive law-makers” and positively design a law or constitutional 
amendments in accordance with their own “political” views, which may or may 
not be constitutional.13 
Every action taken within the institutionalized constitutional framework is an 
exercise of constituted power. In this sense, constituent power is established 
and manifested by means of elective representatives. In times of ordinary leg-
islation, of ordinary constitutional amendments, and even of constitutional re-
placements made according to the provisions of the constitution, the constituted 
government acts on behalf of the people. Rarely the people themselves call 
a constitutional change through a popular initiative. In any case, the constitu-
ent power always retains the power to reconstitute the constitution on its own 
terms, set at any time by the constituent power as sovereign. Even if the power 
to amend the constitution is given to the people, they do not act as a sovereign 
but rather like any other body of the State. The people act as sovereign when 
they abolish a constitution and only in this context. They return into the “state 
of nature” where no legitimate authority exists and where the constituent power 
of the people mirrors their natural right. But there is always a relation between 
past and present, nothing starts ex novo, thus, the constitution-change process 
takes many forms. Contrasting Ramaswamy Iyer, even if a constitution is silent, 
13 For example, Article 68 of the Mongolian Constitution entrenches the specific right of the  Constitutional 
Court to submit proposals for constitutional amendments (gAmper (2015), p. 440).
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the amendment power is not merely granted to Parliament (iyer (2006), p. 2065). 
Under the existing constitution even the people may amend it and only accord-
ing to what the constitution allows. This suggests that their amendment power 
should be regarded as an intermediate power between the original constituent 
power and the derivate legislative power.
Recent exercises of constitution-making demonstrated how original con-
stituent power, or the “people”’s power to remake the constituted powers in 
an existing constitution, thus, stepping outside of their existing political order, 
allows derivative powers, such as powerful political forces, to reshape their con-
stitutional orders unilaterally, evading a need to negotiate with the opposition 
(scheppeLe (2015); LAndAu (forthcoming 2019)). Their action might cover almost 
any kind of change, constitutional or unconstitutional but deemed as demo-
cratic, to the extent that “the people” sweeps in institutional arrangements or 
political movements that purport to articulate “We, the People”. 
Regardless of the way in which the people are called to express themselves, 
either through the representatives or as whole in different ways and moments, 
the people as the holders of a secondary constituent power are more an amend-
er of the text than its author. The question as to how the people may change 
a constitutional order may find a clearer answer if we try to identify and shape 
taxonomies and various procedures. In the vast majority of cases, the reference 
to the people or nation who author the constitution is related to the constitu-
tional amendment process. Such process may call for the involvement of the 
people both by initiative and by referendum. The system of checks and balances 
embedded in the constitution may require limitations on arbitrary action of the 
government but also on the people in exercising their sovereignty. Usually, con-
stitutional changes are closely linked to the amendable nature of the provisions. 
A tiered procedure creates «different rules of constitutional amendment for differ-
ent parts of the constitution»; such parts, usually consisting in eternity clauses, 
may be altered only by referendum and with the aforementioned replacement 
consequences (dixon and LAndAu (2017)). The distinction between “amendment” 
and “revision” allows to identify different mechanisms of constitutional change 
in which people directly or indirectly take part: first, a single-path procedure, 
applied to all amendable provisions, requires a single session14; second, a dou-
ble-path procedure, pursuant to which a single-path procedure is integrated 
by a referendum15, or according to which formal amendments are adopted by 
the parliament after two successive divided debates16; and finally, a multi-path 
14 Germany (Article 79); Austria (Article 44(3), if, in case of partial revision, one third of the members of 
the Federal Council or the National Council do not demand a referendum); France (Article 89(2)).
15 Austria (Article 44(2) and (3); Article 35(4)); France (Article 89(1)).
16 In Italy, the amendments proposed shall be adopted by each house after two successive debates at 
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procedure, which features a referendum to give additional consent – whether 
as an alternative in cases where the legislative chambers do not reach the nec-
essary supermajorities on the proposed amendments (optional referendum),17 
or if this tool is constitutionalized (mandatory referendum).18 A universal popular 
mobilization in support of the proposed constitutional change may bring such 
procedures to a successful conclusion. From an institutionalist perspective, the 
constitution is not a mere catalogue of constitutional rules, but also the tangible 
sum of the constitutional bodies’ practice and narratives surrounding it. Thus, 
the more distant people are from the constitutional amendment process, the 
stronger the narratives for a direct involvement are requested (FoTiAdou (2017), 
pp. 156 ss). Sometimes, difficulties and obstacles encountered in the proce-
dures lead to important changes and innovations in the “popular participatory 
continuum”, as demonstrated by the Iceland, Ireland or UK experiences.19 
Ultimately, constitutional amendments differ from a popular involvement 
point of view; such processes may be: i) permissive, which include explicit or 
implicit popular initiative (Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain, Romania, Latvia, Slo-
venia); ii) consultative in the presence of popular support expressed by both 
discretionary and mandatory referendum (Switzerland, Italy, Romania, Latvia, 
Slovenia, Croatia); iii) strict, without popular initiative or referendum (Hungary).
In various legal systems, the need to protect constitutional rigidity and the 
division of powers is bound up with the representation and participation of the 
people in the constitutional amendment process (Aroney (2006), p. 326). Formal 
amendment rules laid down by the constitutions provide different models to drive 
constitutional change,20 which allows for some observations. First, the amend-
ment process generally favours an indirect participation through their represent-
atives; thus, people may influence constitutional change via elections carrying 
out those “transformative constitutional moments” in which a strong majority or 
a charismatic leader/president elected by the voters paves the way for a new 
interpretation of the constitution. Nonetheless, a few systems allow them to 
intervals of not less than three months (Article 138(1)). The constitutions of Belgium (Article 195) and Spain 
(Article 168) impose electoral preconditions upon formal amendment rules, requiring dissolution of the cham-
bers and successive votes separated by the election of the new chambers, which must ratify the decision 
and examine the new constitutional text. 
17 Within certain time limits, senators, groups of senators or subnational legislatures may demand that 
the approved amendments be submitted to a referendum (Article 138(2) Italian Const.; Article 167(3) Span-
ish Const.)
18 Spain (Article 168 Spanish Const.). See Ferreres comeLLA (2000), p. 45; eLvirA (2011), p. 281; BArrero 
orTegA and soBrino guiJArro, (2013), pp. 299, 302. 
19 Cf. ThorArensen, and FArreLL, hArris and suiTer (2017), pp. 101 ss.; suTeu (2015).
20 For a general account of the formal (and informal) amendment processes based on drivers of consti-
tutional change, see FusAro and oLiver (2011).
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directly initiate constitutional amendments. Such constitutional arrangements 
(Friedrich (1950), p. 295) legitimate the equal participation in the constitutional 
amendment process. In any case, direct inclusion is rare because it actually 
divides amendment powers among vertical levels of government, which affects 
constitutional rigidity (dicey (1885), pp. 142-5). Second, the use of a nationwide 
referendum as an alternate constitutional amendment procedure is a “threat” 
through which to bypass the legislature. By giving people strong veto powers, 
this tool could reverse the entire amendment process through a rejection of the 
changes proposed, and it could undermine the consistency of the representative 
chambers.21 
3. Conclusions
It is now rooted the creed that the constitution is the political heart of “the 
people” as nation and that amendment rules are at the core of constitutionalism, 
defining the conditions under which all other constitutional norms may be legally 
displaced, and providing mechanisms for societies to refine their constitution-
al arrangements. Formal constitutional amendment rules consider the overall 
framework of the political system to dictate how constitutional change should 
occur even in such historical moments of populist turn. This paper tried to em-
phasize the role of the people, stressing a tridimensional definition, their claim in 
different constitutional moments and the way in which such alterations may be 
initiated. Still, many questions remain open to debate.
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